What are the prospects that the Israeli-Hezbollah ceasefire will hold and for how long? For insight, Amna Nawaz spoke with Rob Malley. He was the U.S. Special Envoy for Iran during the Biden administration and was part of the team that negotiated the nuclear agreement with Iran during the Obama administration. Amna Nawaz: So what are the prospects that the Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire will hold, and for how long? For insights, we turn now to Rob Malley. He was the U.S. special envoy for Iran during the Biden administration and was also part of the team that negotiated the 2015 Iran nuclear deal during the Obama administration. He's now a senior fellow at Yale and president emeritus of the International Crisis Group, where he directs their Middle East Program. He joins us tonight from Abu Dhabi. Rob, welcome back to the "News Hour." Let's start with that first question here. In your view, how real is the possibility that the fighting in Lebanon, Israel and Hezbollah, neither backing off, how real is the possibility it could derail the entire process moving forward? Robert Malley, Former U.S. Special Envoy to Iran: Well, this is a deal that is brimming with ambiguity, with discrepant interpretations, room for discord, nowhere and nowhere more violently than when it comes to Lebanon. And that's because, in that case, Israel's position is, we should have a free hand to take the action that we believe is necessary for our self-defense, for our security, and we're certainly not going to withdraw from Southern Lebanon. Iran takes the view that the deal provides for a comprehensive cease-fire, which they interpret as meaning respect for Lebanese sovereignty and therefore an end to the occupation. And the U.S. doesn't really seem to know what it wants, other than to scramble repeatedly to salvage the deal. So it probably is the most delicate piece of the deal at this point. And the question is going to be, does the U.S. put enough pressure on Netanyahu? Is Netanyahu prepared to alienate his political base, which is not happy about an imposed cease-fire? And is Iran prepared to turn a blind eye to some violations of the cease-fire so long as they don't cross a threshold? And that's a delicate balancing act we have seen play out today. And I suspect we're going to see it playing out over the days to come. Amna Nawaz: As I mentioned, you're joining us from Abu Dhabi. Tell us how this deal, the news events of the last few days, the framework deal, the details that have come out, the limited, now tenuous cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, how is all of that resonating in the Gulf region? Robert Malley: So I just heard Vice President Vance saying the difference between this deal and the JCPOA is that whereas, in 2015, the Gulf countries were apoplectic about the deal, now they're enthusiastic. I'd say that's overstated. It is true that they are much happier today than they were in 2015, but that's not because they love this deal. It's because they wanted to enter this war. This war was costing them economically. It was costing them in terms of their image of stability, security, the financial hub that is Dubai, right near where I am today. So they're relieved that it's over. They are quite skeptical that this deal is going to come to fruition in terms of the greater, broader deal that's supposed to occur in 60 days. But at this point, what they want to do is make sure that the fighting doesn't resume and get to negotiations. Amna Nawaz: How do you see this deal and negotiations moving forward? Because I should point out, when the details first came out, there was a lot of criticism about what Iran got from the deal versus what the U.S. got. You supported the agreement. You said that it was preferable to any of the alternatives on offer, period. Why? Where do you think it leads next? Robert Malley: So, the first thing, for me, what is the target right now, what is the real object of criticism is the war, not this deal, this memorandum of understanding, which is necessary to end it. And so, yes, when you have a war that is catastrophic, that leads to strategic failure, strategic defeat by the U.S., you don't -- you can't get the ideal deal that you would want. You get a deal that at a minimum does two things, ends the war, opens the Strait of Hormuz. That's what it does. And that's what I say, we should welcome it. By the way, when people say that it surrenders so much for Iran, let's not forget how much Iran has lost as a result of this illegal -- illegal unnecessary unjustified war, hundreds of billions of dollars of losses. A 10 percent drop in their GDP is what the estimate is at this point. So the benefits they're going to get in terms of some oil sales, perhaps some access to the frozen assets, that's peanuts compared to what they lost. When the critics are talking about the big deal, the big amounts of money that Iran might get, that's if they get the nuclear deal, which we're far from achieving at this point, and I think there's every reason to be skeptical that they will get there. So, at this point, they're not getting that much. They still suffered far more than they're going to receive. I'm not sure why people should look at that and say that Iran has somehow plundered the U.S. Amna Nawaz: Well, this leads me to what we have heard from Vice President J.D. Vance as well, which is that Iran is somehow economically incentivized to change their behavior. Do you agree with that? I mean, what have you seen from this regime, from Mojtaba Khamenei in particular, that says Iran could change its behavior because of economic incentives? Robert Malley: It's a great question. Obviously, there's going to be a debate in Iran between the leadership, between those who say we now have this opportunity. Let's make some concessions, not the grand transformation that the Trump administration is talking about, but some serious concessions, in order to get genuine economic relief, and others who are going to say, we can't trust the United States. They have betrayed us more than once, and this president twice in the last year, we can't trust their promises. We have shown that we can -- we have more leverage by closing the Strait of Hormuz than anywhere else. So let's not accept this and let's not give up our ideological creed for the sake of an unreliable president. So I think there's going to be a debate. My hope is that some economic incentives are going to be enough to get Iran to move from where they are now. I'm not somebody who believes that this is going to happen overnight, that it's going to be a 180 degree transformation. But I do think that what is needed is real economic incentives with the Gulf countries I'm in right now are prepared to give in exchange for concessions by Iran. Amna Nawaz: So I have less than a minute left. I have to ask the big question here, which is, now the 60-day clock has begun. Do you see this leading to some kind of lasting nuclear deal? Robert Malley: I think the notion that, in 60 days, they're going to be able to resolve all of the issues pertaining to sanctions, all other issues pertaining to the nuclear program is virtually impossible. What I think is possible is either progress that incentivize both to get an extension, which is contemplated by the deal, or mini-deals, small nuclear steps, small sanctions relief, something better than breaking -- than a breakdown, which would lead to resumption of war, closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with all the damage that we have already witnessed. Amna Nawaz: All right, Robert Malley, president emeritus of the International Crisis Center, joining us tonight from Abu Dhabi, thank you so much for your time. Robert Malley: Thank you.
<small>Source: PBS NewsHour</small>
